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タイトル
  • en An Exception that Proves the Rule: Japanese Monetary Policy under the Classical Gold Standard, 1897–1914
作成者
    • ja 髙木, 信二 en Takagi, Shinji ja-Kana タカギ, シンジ
主題
  • Other en JEL classification: F33, F55, E42, E58
  • Other en classical gold standard
  • Other en rules of the game
  • Other en Japanese monetary policy
  • Other en Japan under the classical gold standard
  • Other en Bank of Japan discount rate policy
内容注記
  • Abstract en The paper explores Japanese monetary policy under the classical gold standard (1897–1914), while providing a succinct exposition of the distinguishing features of the Japanese gold standard regime. The paper, explaining how the Bank of Japan conducted monetary policy, finds that, as a general practice, (i) it used fiduciary issues to offset movements in monetary gold so as to stabilize the supply of currency; (ii) it moved the discount rate in the same direction as the government moved the extra issue tax rate; and (iii) it raised the discount rate in response to an increase in gold outflows. The rules-of-the-game-like behavior of discount rate policy, motivated by the central bank’s mandate to preserve gold convertibility, was robust and consistent, challenging the semi-consensual view that violations of the rules were frequent and pervasive under the classical gold standard.
日付
    Issued2024-11
言語
  • eng
資源タイプ working paper
出版タイプ NA
資源識別子 URI https://agi.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/2000096
収録誌情報
  • en AGI Working Paper Series
  • 2024-11 開始ページ1 終了ページ28
ファイル
コンテンツ更新日時 2025-06-27